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Judicial notice may be defined generally as a court's acceptance of
the truth of a matter without formal evidentiary proof.' The origins of
,the concept of judicial notice, though hazy, are thought to have arisen
out of the medieval belief that the judge, as a "learned man" of the age,
was skilled in each of the seven science's; he had, or at least was presumed
to have had, at his command, all .the ,world's knowledge. 2 The ,fiction of
judicial notice, therefore, was.merely a means of reminding the judge
of that which he was already presumed tos know. s early as 1222,
'Bracton noted in the margin of one of his works that '"aque manifesta
s.hnt, non indigent probacione" ("that which is obvious' need not be
proved"), 4 and a yearbook printed in .302 shows that^ this abstract,
time-saving principle was by then being applied to concrete factual
situations. L " ,
The first discussion regarding the setting of boundaries within which
a judge was permitted to pass on questions of fact without having received
evidence on the issue did not appear until Bentham's early nineteenth
century work on evidence.6 In describing the procedure as it then existed,
Bentham stated that either party might ask the judge to assume, as
proven fact, a specified matter which was notoriously true. The proponent
was required to prove the fact only if the opposing party not only
demanded that the matter be proved, but also was willing to declare, in
good faith, that he personally disbelieved the fact.
7
The purpose of the present discussion is to describe the concept of
judicial notice as it now exists. Recent cases and contemporary commen-
tary will be perused in order to gain an insight into current judicial
and scholarly thought on the subject matter and scope of the concept
at both the trial court and appellate court levels. A "functional approach"
to the scope of judicial notice will be introduced and will serve as a focal
point from which to analyze the effect of judicial notice on the right
to trial by jury, the right to confrontation, and the adversary system.
Finally, there will be a brief examination of the effect, present and poten-
tial, of judicial notice on judicial administration and the rules of evidence.
1. "That a matter is judicially noticed means merely that it is taken as true
without the offering of evidence by the party who should ordinarily have done so."
9 J. WIOGMOR, EvIDENcE § 2567(a) (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMoRg].
2. Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLUm. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1922).
3. Id.
4. McNaughton, Judicial Notice - Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore
Controversy, 14 VAND. L. lZv. 779, 783 (1961), citing 2 BRAC'rON's N.B., case 194
(1222) (marginal notation) [hereinafter cited as McNaughton].
5. Id., citing Y.B. 30 & 31 Edw. I (R.S.) 256-59 (1302).
6. J. BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENcE 256-57 (1827). The term
"judicial notice" does not appear in Bentham's treatise. It is first mentioned by Starkie
in a work published the following year. T. STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE or THt
LAW oF EVIDENCe 400 (2d ed. 1828). Starkie did not comment on the use of this
phrase, but rather confined his comments to a recitation of Bentham's views.
7. This procedure appears to be more akin to that of a contemporary request
for an admission than to the current procedure for taking judicial notice. See, e.g.,
F41. R. Civ. P. 36(d).
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II. SUBJECT MATTER AND SCOPE OF JUDICIAL NOTICE
Courts may take judicial notice of law as well as of fact. The rules
regarding judicial notice of law will be set forth initially, followed by a
presentation of the various means of sub-classifying the extra-record facts
of which courts may take judicial notice. An examination of the tradi-
tional views regarding the procedures to be followed in taking, and the
scope of, judicial notice will then be made. Finally, the scope of judicial
notice will be scrutinized in light of the function being performed by the
court when it takes notice of extra-record facts.
A. Matters Subject to Judicial Notice
1. Law
Courts will take judicial notice of the common law, statutory law,
and a variety of governmental pronouncements in accordance with the
rules of their particular jurisdiction.8 All courts will take judicial notice
of the decisions and statutes of their own jurisdiction,9 and many will
notice those of sister states as well. 10 Originally, some jurisdictions held
the determination of foreign law, that is, the law of a jurisdiction other
than the forum, to be a question of fact for the jury, while others viewed
it as a special type of factual question which the judge alone should
decide." The area is now generally governed by statutes,' 2 some providing
that judicial notice of foreign law is mandatory 13 and others merely
permitting such notice.
14
8. See, e.g., UNnORm RULt or EVIDENcE 9 which provides in part:
(1) Judicial notice shall be taken without request by a party, of the common
law, constitutions and public statutes in force in every state, territory and
jurisdiction of the United States....
(2) Judicial notice may be taken without request by a party, of (a) private
acts and resolutions of the Congress of the United States and of the
legislature of this state, and duly enacted ordinances and duly published
regulations of governmental subdivisions or agencies of this state and
(b) the laws of foreign countries ...
(emphasis added).
MODEL CODE Or EVIDINcn rule 801 (1942) places in the mandatory category
only the common law and public statutes in force in the forum state. The laws of
other states of the United States are left to the discretionary provisions of rule 802.
9. Keefe, Landis & Shadd, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN.
L. Riv. 664, 674 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Keefe]. For example, the Maryland
Court of Appeals has declared:
The judge was clearly entitled to take judicial notice not only of the law with
regard to the territorial jurisdiction of [the Police] Department but also that laws
against lotteries and other forms of gambling are among those which it is the
duty of that Department to enforce in Baltimore City.
Dean v. State, 205 Md. 274, 279, 107 A.2d 88, 90 (1954).
10. For a list of jurisdictions which take judicial notice of the laws of sister
states see Keefe, supra note 9, at 684 nn.74 & 75.
11. Note, Social and Economic Facts - Appraisal of Suggested Techniques for
Presenting Them to the Courts, 61 HARV. L. Rev. 692, 699 (1948).
12. Only Texas and Vermont have no statutory provisions. Keefe, supra note 9,
at 683.
13. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 70 (1957).
14. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. §§ 4511(a)-(b) (McKinney 1963).
COMMENTS
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Twenty-nine states have adopted the Uniform Judicial Notice of
Foreign Law Act.15 This act provides for mandatory judicial notice of
the common law and statutes of other states, 16 but specifies that the
determination of the law of foreign countries, while an issue for the
court, is not subject to judicial notice.' 7  This latter restriction seems
unfortunate, especially in the instances of Canadian and English law,
which the judge may easily research. A statute such as the New York
Civil Practice Act which permits, but does not require, the court to
judicially notice the law of a foreign country18 would appear to be far
more desirable.
It has been suggested that the best means of according both a reason-
able and uniform treatment for judicial notice of law would be a federal
statute providing for mandatory notice of the law of sister states and
permissive notice of the law of foreign countries.' 9
2. Fact 20
a. Common Knowledge v. Verifiable Certainty. - A fact cannot be
properly judicially noticed unless it possesses some degree of certainty,
and two tests are currently in use which attempt to define that degree.
The first is the traditional test of whether the fact to be noticed is within
the common knowledge of the community.2 1 However, there has been
a modern trend away from this test and towards one which provides
that a fact may be noticed if it is verifiably certain by reference to compe-
tent, authoritative sources.
22
15. AM. JUR. 2d, DESK BOOK, Doc. No. 129 (Supp. 1966).
16. UNIFORM JUDICIAL NoTIcE or FOREIGN LAW ACT § 1.
17. UNIFORM JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAW ACT § 5.
18. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §§ 4511(a)-(b) (McKinney 1963).
19. See Hartwig, Congressional Enactment of Uniform Judicial Notice Act, 40
MICH. L. REv. 174 (1941). In addition, see the model act suggested in Keefe, supra
note 9, at 689.
20. It should be noted that courts are sometimes said to take judicial notice of"political facts." What is really meant is that they will receive information from
another branch of the government whose findings are binding on the courts. See, e.g.,
Lehigh Valley R.R. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1927) (holding that the
court might not make an independent determination as to which Russian official should
be recognized as the legitimate one, but must accept the state department's decision
on the matter). See also J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN, J. MANSFIELD,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 11 (5th ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as MAGUIRE] ;
9 WIGMORE § 2574; McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 VAND. L. REv. 296, 312-13 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as McCormick].
21. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. W. H. Hunt Estate Co., 49 Cal. 2d 565,
319 P.2d 1044 (1957) (water pipes sometimes break from accidental causes) ; Portee v.
Kronzek, 194 Pa. Super. 193, 166 A.2d 328 (1960) (people visit taverns to meet
friends).
22. See, e.g., Fringer v. Venema, 26 Wis. 2d 366, 132 N.W.2d 565, rehearing
denied and mandate corrected, 26 Wis. 2d 366, 133 N.W.2d 809 (1965) (a bull must
be older than six months to be capable of fertilizing fifteen heifers within five months) ;
UNIFORM RULE Or EVIDENCE 9 entitled "Facts Which Must or May Be Judicially
Noticed":
(1) Judicial notice shall be taken without request by a party . . . of such
specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge as are so uni-
versally known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute.
(2) Judicial notice may be taken without request by a party, of ... (c) such
facts as are so generally known or of such common notoriety within the
[VOL. 13
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b. Adjudicative v. Legislative. - The facts of which courts take
judicial notice are sometimes classified as either adjudicative or legislative.
Adjudicative facts are facts about the particular parties to the contro-
versy, their activities, their property, and their interests.23 Facts which
help answer who did what, when, where, why, how, and with what motive
and intent are all adjudicative. 24 It is to these facts that the jury in a jury
trial, or the judge in a non-jury trial, applies the existing law. 5 Legisla-
tive facts, on the other hand, are used exclusively by the judge
when he is developing law and policy. 26 They are used not to discover
the facts to which the law will be applied, but rather to discover and
develop the law itself. Thus, when the judge is interpreting a statute,27
or ruling on its constitutionality,28 or creating new law to bridge gaps
in existing doctrines, 2 9 the facts upon which he relies are termed legisla-
tive facts.3 0
c. Specific v. General; Ultimate v. Non-Ultimate. - Adjudicative
facts have at times been sub-classified into general and specific facts. The
significance of this sub-classification is that courts will more readily take
judicial notice of general than of specific facts. 3 1 Notice may be taken
of general facts which are well known to everyone, for example, that
parking is a problem in most big cities, 32 or of general facts less familiar
to a layman, such as, that any car traveling at ten miles-per-hour may be
stopped within thirty-five feet of the braking point.33 By a process of
syllogistic reasoning, such general propositions may be used to deduce a
specific fact relating to the parties at hand, as for example, that since
any car traveling at ten miles-per-hour may be stopped within thirty-five
feet of the braking point, if defendant were traveling at ten miles-per-hour,
and braked at point X, he could have stopped within thirty-five feet of
point X.
territorial jurisdiction of the court that they cannot reasonably be the
subject of dispute, and (d) specific facts and propositions of generalized
knowledge which are capable of immediate and accurate determination
by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.
23. McCormick, supra note 20, at 315.
24. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. Rzv. 945, 952 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as Davis].
25. Id.
26. McCormick, supra note 20, at 315.
27. See, e.g., Potts v. Coll, 140 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
28. See, e.g., Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
29. See, e.g., Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
30. See MAGUIRE, supra note 20, at 9-10; Note, supra note 11, at 692.
The same facts may be legislative or adjudicative depending on their use.
For example, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d
Cir. 1945), the court took judicial notice of records of aluminum production compiled
in the interim between its judgment and decree for the legislative purpose of fashioning
the decree, but not for the adjudicative purpose of determining the correctness of
the findings.
31. Compare Equitable Trust Co. v. McComb, 19 Del. Ch. 387, 168 A. 203 (1933),
with Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 229 Mass. 7, 11 N.E.2d 482 (1937). See McCormick,
supra note 20, at 297.
32. See Radcliffe College v. City of Cambridge, - Mass. _ 215 N.E.2d
892, 895 (1966).
33. See Richardson v. Wendel, 401 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Mo. 1966).
COMMENTS
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At times judicial notice of specific facts is taken directly, that is,
without the initial step of establishing general facts which will form
the premise for subsequent reasoning. Thus, a court, without formal
introduction of evidence, could find that during a particular period there
was little rainfall in the area where plaintiff's land was located3 4 or that
the particular area where an accident took place was a business district.3 5
If the fact, whether general or specific, is necessary for either party
to prove his case, it is termed an ultimate fact. Since courts will be less
prone to judicially notice a fact which will be determinative of the out-
come of the case,36 it is important to distinguish between ultimate and
non-ultimate (evidentiary) facts. The last example given could represent
an ultimate fact - since defendant was charged with exceeding the speed
limit set for a "business district," it was necessary to prove that he was
driving in a business district at the time of the alleged violation. The
former example, regarding the rainfall, could illustrate a non-ultimate
fact3 7 which, although not itself dispositive of the case, may prove useful in
reasoning towards an ultimate fact. Thus, after noticing that there was
little rainfall in the area where plaintiff's land was located, the court
could conclude that the flooding complained of must have been caused
by defendant's dam.
B. Scope of Judicial Notice
1. The Morgan-Wigmore Dichotomy
The scope of judicial notice of fact has been traditionally considered
in the context of the Morgan-Wigmore, indisputable-disputable contro-
versy. 8 On the one side, Professors Morgan and McNaughton39 contend
that the primary purpose of judicial notice is to prevent wasteful litiga-
tion of moot questions of fact.4 0 Therefore, they maintain that judicial
notice should be confined to indisputables, that is, those facts which are
so notorious or so universally known or so easily and accurately verifiable
that they cannot reasonably be disputed.41 They reason that since judicial
34. In Union Pac. R.R. v. Irrigation Dist., 253 F. Supp. 251, 255 (D. Ore. 1966),
the court first listed statistics on the recent rainfall in the area where defendant's
canal was located and then took judicial notice of the fact that the canal was in an
extremely arid region of the state.
35. See Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 181 P. 223 (1919).
36. Cf. State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951) (lower court took
notice that the value of the car allegedly stolen by the defendant was worth in excess
of $50.00, the amount required for a larceny conviction).
37. For examples of judicial notice of non-ultimate facts see Datlof v. United
States, 252 F. Supp. 11, 23 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (Oct. 5, 1955 was a Wednesday);
Boles v. Cox, 252 F. Supp. 173, 174 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) (two defendants were
lawyers); Koller v. W. E. Plechaty Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 57, 66, 216 N.E.2d 399, 406
(1965) (plaintiff was suffering pain).
38. See 2 CONRAD, MODERN TRIAL EvIDENCE § 986 (1956) ; Davis, A System of
Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in PERSPECTIVES op LAW 69 (1964).
39. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REv. 269, 279 (1944) [hereinafter
cited as Morgan].
40. See McNaughton, supra note 4, at 779.
41. The situation as to disputed and disputable issues of fact is different. Neither
judge nor jury is bound to have knowledge concerning disputable matters of fact;
neither is permitted to make an independent investigation. Both must be content
to use such material as is presented in the course of the proceeding.
Morgan, supra note 39, at 271.
[VOL. 13
7
Giudice and Kraft: The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial Notice
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
,SPRI.NG 1968]
notiqe, by their definition; applies. only, to, indisputables, ,once:.such an
.indisputable! proposition is properly noticed-, -it, should .not be allowed
to be controverted42 ln'6ther words, judicial notice'!i's"doiiclusiV; so that
in a jury trial, once a judge judicially notices a fact, he should give the
jury binding ifistrutioins to fin' the fact as noticed,43 and no evidence
may 'be'ifitroduced in an effoft to' persuade the jury' to make a findifig
contrary to the noticed fact. The parties may, however, present informal
"information" 44 to the judge, before or after his ruling, in an effort to
convince him that the fact'is not indisputable. 45
On the other side of the dispute, Professors Wigmore and Thayer
contend thdt a judge may notice 'facts unlikely to be challenged as well
as those'c6risidered to be absolutely indisputable.46 Under their definition,
judicial notice operates in the way of 'a presumption.47 Says Thayer:
Taking judicial notice does not import that the matter is indis-
putable. It is not necessarily anything more than a prima facia recog-
42. See, e.g., Verner v. Redman, 77 Ariz. 310, 271 P.2d 468 (1954); Stocker v.
Boston & Me. R.R., 83 N.H. 401, 143 A. 68 (1928) ; Appeal of Albert, 372 Pa. 13,
92 A.2d 663 (1952). In the last cited case, the Pennsylvania supreme court refused to
receive evidence that the Communist Party did not advocate the overthrow of the
government by force and violence.
43. This position has been adopted by UNIFORm RULt or EvDNCH 11:
If a matter judicially noticed is other than the common law or constitution or
public statutes of this state, the 'judge shall indicate for the record the matter
which is judicially noticed and if the matter would otherwise have 'been for
determination by a trier of fact other than the judge, he shall instruct the trier
of fact to accept as a fact the' matter so noticed.
44. Professor Davis makes the criticism that in a nonjury trial the distinction
between the informal presentation of material on the issue of the propriety of taking
notice, before or after the judge's ruling, permissible under the Morgan view, and the
introduction of formal evidence to rebut a judicially noticed fact, not permitted by
Morgan, may be tenuous, since the same person, the judge, receives both the "informa-
tion" and "evidence." Davis, supra note 24, at 77-78 ii.13. McNaughton admits that
this criticism is valid, yet he insists that the differentiation between "information" and
"evidence" be made. McNaughton, supra note'4, at' 804 n.4.
"''45. See Morgan, supra note 39, at 287., ,
r 46. See Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience,in rPZ SPI CTIVr s 0or LAw 81'(1964). .. . " """" "
Wigmore, in discussing the scope of iudicial notice, states that facts which
may.be noticed, include:
(1)' Matters 'which are actually so notorious t all fhat' th roduction,,gf
evidence would, be unnecessary; ' ,
(2) Matters which the 'judicial function .supposes, *the jIudge t6l.be- i quainted
with, i tlieory" at le st". o
,  ...... . .. .
(3) Sundry miters, not inclu'ded .uqder either of -thise heads.; they are subject
for the rrost part to the consideration'th'at though they are neitler actually
notoriou., nor, bound to ,be judicially. known, yet they would be ca i leof
suchinstant and tinquestionable denionstration, if,-desired, that 'no party
wou'd tliink of imposing a falsity on thte tribual in theface of an'int !Ii'
gent adversary. face.of'an.in.-ll. -
9 W,,iGmoRF,§ 2571. ... .. . .
,,, 47.,. McNaughtn. arg'ues conti, ithat the, sysiem of;presu mptions created by the
Wignore. rationale lacks dfined ,ules to guide' its'"implementation. To poini out the
difficulties, of 'its operation 'he asks':, What' showing will' give ise to 'the presump-
tion? Upon whom is 'h'e bur'den o f -'ebuttal?, 'What is, the, extent of, this burden?
McNauighton, supra note 4, at 783. Davis, ' in defending the Wignore position,' states
that in order for a judge to take judicial'notice of a fact he must merely believe that
the fact-seems to be true, and does 'not, in his'judgment, require proof. Once so
noticed, absent any 'reason to believe differently, it'will be 'considered true. Davis
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nition, leaving the matter still open to controversy.. .. In very many
cases . . . taking judicial notice of a fact is merely presuming it, i.e.,
assuming it until there shall be reason to think otherwise.
48
Under the Wigmore-Thayer approach, as under the Morgan approach,
the parties may initially present information to the court to help it decide
whether or not it should take judicial notice of the particular fact in
question. If the judge decides to notice the fact, he will instruct the jury
that they may find the noticed fact to be true even though no evidence
has been introduced in its support. The opponent of the fact, at this point,
has the option of producing material in an effort to convince the judge
that he has decided incorrectly - that he should not have noticed the fact
because the fact was not unlikely to be challenged. Having failed to
dissuade the judge as to the propriety of taking notice, or not having
attempted to do so, the opponent of the fact may yet introduce evidence
directed at rebutting the presumption and persuading the jury to find that
the noticed fact is not true.49
2. The Functional Approach
A functional approach to both the classification and scope of judicial
notice of fact should prove to be far more helpful than any of the above
categorizations. It has been suggested that the primary policy consideration
underlying the question of the scope of judicial notice is the division of
authority between judge and jury.50 Hence, the freedom of the court to
take judicial notice should vary according to the function it is performing
when it takes such notice.
a. Pre-trial. - In the exercise of his pre-trial duties, the judge
frequently may have to consider a demurrer to a complaint or a motion
for summary judgment. In ruling on a demurrer, the judge must decide
whether the complaint itself states a cause of action.51 He is not concerned
48. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EvMENCE 308-09 (1898) [herein-
after cited as TIHAYER].
49. See, e.g., Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 301-02
(1937); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.Zd 416 (2d Cir. 1945);
Makos v. Prince, 64 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1953) ; Scheufler v. Continental Life Ins. Co.,
350 Mo. 886, 169 S.W.2d 359 (1943); State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d
600 (1951).
Even in a so-called "disputables" jurisdiction, if the fact that is noticed is
such that reasonable men could not find to the contrary, the judge may properly dis-
allow argument to the contrary and give the jury binding instructions to find the fact
as noticed. See p. 539 infra.
It has been said that "judges ... necessarily use extra-record facts which are
neither indisputable nor found in sources of indisputable accuracy," Davis, supra note
24, at 948-49, and this statement itself is uncontrovertible. Hence, whenever "indis-
putables" jurisdictions are discussed in the remainder of this Comment, the reference
is depicting the procedure followed by the jurisdiction; where the discussion is re-
ferring to facts which are literally indisputable, they will be referred to as such.
50. See 9 WIGMORE § 2567. This, of course, does not mean that in a nonjury trial,
or in an appellate proceeding, there are no problems as to the proper scope of judicial
notice. Such problems will be examined in detail in the ensuing discussion.
51. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6), the contemporary federal counterpart of
the common law demurrer.
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with whether the plaintiff might have stated a cause of action had other
facts been alleged, but rather with whether the facts, as pleaded, are
sufficient. It has been argued, therefore, that judicial notice cannot be
applied to the construction of a pleading and that, in ruling upon a de-
murrer, while the court must take as true every fact well pleaded, it
must assume no others.52 This broad contention has been rejected as a
basis for completely prohibiting the use of judicial notice in ruling on a
demurrer. 53 Judges have noticed facts both in upholding complaints54 and
in striking them as insufficient.5 However, in light of the judge's limited
function in ruling on a demurrer, there appear to be cogent reasons for
urging a very limited use of judicial notice in this area. 6 A court, in
ruling on a demurrer, should refrain from noticing any fact which is not
literally indisputable and which the parties could not reasonably raise in
further pleadings or on argument at trial.
Similar reasoning would support a demand for restricting the court's
use of judicial notice in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Here
the judge's function is to examine the pleadings and accompanying affidavits
of witnesses and upon finding no issues of fact, to render a final judgment
on the law.57 Although judicial notice has been used in connection with
summary judgment motions, 58 the judge should, in practice, attempt to
confine himself to the pleadings and affidavits before him,59 except, again,
for literal indisputables which are beyond the realm of being debatable
issues at trial.
b. Trial. - At the trial level, the judge may have to rule on pre-
liminary fact questions bearing upon the admissibility of evidence. For
example, he might have to decide whether a confession was coerced,
whether an original document is unavailable, or whether a witness is mar-
ried to a party in the case or was the client of a particular attorney.60
Such preliminary determinations are generally held to be within the prov-
52. See People v. Oakland Water-Front Co., 118 Cal. 234, 50 P. 305, 308 (1897).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., De Baker v. Southern Cal. Ry., 106 Cal. 257, 39 P. 610 (1893) ; Cole
v. Segraves, 88 Cal. 104, 25 P. 1109 (1891).
55. See, e.g., People v. Oakland Water-Front Co., 118 Cal. 234, 50 P. 305 (1897);
Wilson v. Loew's, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 126, 298 P.2d 126 (1956).
56. See, e.g., Chavez v. Times-Mirror Co., 185 Cal. 20, 195 P. 666 (1921), a libel
case in which the court took judicial notice that a certain person was a public defender,
and not a judge, but refused to judicially notice plaintiff's knowledge of this fact.
57. For further explication of the procedure to be followed on a motion for
summary judgment see F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.18 (1965).
58. See, e.g., Stafford v. Ware, 187 Cal. App. 2d 227, 9 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1960),
where the court, in considering a plea of res judicata, took judicial notice of the
pleadings in another action in order to determine whether the issues were the same
as those in the case before it.
59. In American Universal Ins. Co. v. Ranson, 59 Wash. 2d 811, 370 P.2d 867
(1962), the court refused to notice the findings made in another action before another
department of the same court.
60. Cf. Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Pre-
lininary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. Rev. 165, 167 (1929).
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ince of the judge rather than the jury6' for several reasons, the primary one
being to prevent overburdening the jury.62 In a prolonged trial, the jury
might very well forget which evidence was admitted on the preliminary
questions and which on the ultimate issues. Moreover, in the instance of
evidence falling within an exclusionary rule, to ask the jury to strike a
particular fact from their minds - for example, the existence of a con-
fession - if they find certain other matters to be true - for example,
that the confession was coerced - is to ask them to perform the most
difficult type of mental gymnastics. 63 The preliminary questions, then, are
concededly within the judge's realm, and there is no issue as to protecting
any right of a party to have the jury decide such questions. Furthermore,
the judge does not encounter the procedural limitations that he faces in
ruling on a demurrer or a summary judgment motion. Therefore, the
court should be permitted a broad use of judicial notice in making pre-
liminary fact determinations.
Similarly, in ruling directly on the admissibility of evidence - for
example, whether radar6 4 or drunkometer readings65 are reliable enough
to be admissible - it is the function of the judge alone to decide all
questions on the admissibility of evidence at the trial. 66 Since he is given
broad discretion when making such decisions, 67 he should be permitted
an expansive scope as to facts he may judicially notice.
In the function of finding adjudicative facts,6 the primary concern
is with the judge's powers and duties in instructing the jury and with
his province as the factfinder in nonjury trials. When the judge instructs
the jury he defines the relevant law and explains how it should be applied
to the facts as found by the jury.69 The jury is the factfinder and the
61. Gorton v. Hadsell, 9 Cush. 508 (Mass. 1852) ; Maguire & Epstein, Prelimi-
nary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L.
Riv. 392 (1927).
It should be noted that in some jurisdictions the trial judge will admit
the evidence if he determines the preliminary fact question in favor of admissibility,
but he will instruct the jury to disregard it unless it also decides the preliminary
question in favor of admissibility. In other jurisdictions the trial judge has no duty
to determine the preliminary question, and he may rule on it finally, or he may pass the
entire question of admissibility to the jury. Still other jurisdictions go one step
further by requiring that the judge admit the evidence whether or not he would
have ruled it admissible. The jury is then instructed to decide the preliminary ques-
tion of fact and to ignore the admitted evidence if it concludes that the evidence
should have been excluded. See Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Deter-
ruination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REv. 165, 175-89 (1929).
62. See Maguire & Epstein, supra note 61, at 393.
63. Id. at 392-93; Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of
Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. Riv. 165, 167 (1929).
64. State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. 1959).
65. State v. Miller, 64 N.J. Super. 262, 165 A.2d 829 (1960).
66. "But it is the province of the judge, who presides at the trial, to decide all
questions on the admissibility of evidence." Gorton v. Hadsell, 9 Cush. 508, 511
(Mass. 1852).
67. Id.
68. See p. 533 supra. It should be noted that this Comment is primarily con-
cerned with the judge's function in finding facts or in instructing the jury. Thus,
unless otherwise indicated, it will be assumed that the discussion is dealing with
these functions.
69. F. JAM9s, JR., CIVIL PROCMDURE § 7.14 (1965).
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judge the lawgiver. 0 When the court takes judicial notice of a fact, and
instructs the jury that it must find the noticed fact to be true, the judge
is engaging in factfinding. It follows that any such factfinding in a jury
trial should be more limited than in a nonjury trial where the judge
himself is the factfinder. In the latter instance, the judge need not be
concerned with invading the province of the jury or with violating a party's
right to trial by jury.
71
By analogizing judicial notice to a summary judgment or a directed
verdict, it may be argued that even in a jury trial the judge does not
invade the jury's factfinding province when the fact he is noticing is
indisputable or uncontroverted. Both a summary judgment and a directed
verdict are based upon uncontroverted issues of fact. Theoretically, there
are no facts at issue, and, therefore, neither a summary judgment nor a
directed verdict usurps the jury's fact-finding function.72 Following this
analogy, judicial notice of an uncontroverted fact should not be held to
infringe upon the province of the jury.
c. Judicial Legislation. - Judges, at both the trial and the appellate
levels, may also perform a legislative function, that is, create new law to
supplement existing doctrines.73 Courts necessarily must, and in fact do,
make wide use of judicial notice when they are exercising their law-
making function.7 4 Like the legislature, the judge is guided by considera-
tions of expediency and public policy grounded on various social, economic,
political or scientific facts which are often generalized and statistical and
far from indisputable.7 5 To require formal proof of such underlying facts
would be enormously expensive and time-consuming, and, moreover, would
not be procedurally possible at the appellate level where most judicial
legislation takes place.7 6  In addition, since this legislative function is
solely within the judge's province and discretion, 77 he should be allowed a
broader range of judicial notice here than when he is employing judicial
notice to find facts or instruct the jury.
7 8
70. See, e.g., Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1962) ; State v. White,
247 La. 19, 169 So. 2d 894 (1964).
71. For a complete discussion on the effect of judicial notice on the right to trial
by jury see Part III infra.
72. See Whitsell v. Alexander, 229 F.2d 47 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
932 (1956).
73. See Note, Social and Economic Facts - Appraisal of Suggested Techniques
for Presenting Them to the Courts, 61 HARV. L. Rv. 692 (1948).
74. See p. 533 supra.
75. See McCormick, supra note 20, at 315-16. Such facts, of course, fall within
the legislative, rather than the adjudicative, category.
76. Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in
PERSPECTIVES oF LAw 69 (1964).
77. See Note, supra note 73.
78. Courts seen as super legislatures must be allowed to roam far and wide
and must at all costs not be inhibited by any requirement that the facts with
which they deal must be either found in the record or attributable to common
knowledge or sources of indisputable accuracy. The law, in short, must be seen
as a creative process and the rules of judicial notice recast to expedite this
creativity.
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d. Post-trial. - In dealing with post-trial matters, the function and
authority of the judge varies according to the nature of the proceeding.
The trial judge, for example, has a great deal of discretion in ruling upon
motions for new trials. 79 The trial court's discretion must be given
deference on appeal, and is not subject to reversal unless a clear abuse of
discretion is shown.80 Thus, in ruling on a motion for a new trial, it would
appear that in order to properly fulfill its duties, the court can, and perhaps
should, use judicial notice quite freely.
The judge also has broad discretionary powers in sentencing. Al-
though the guilt or innocence of a defendant is determined by a jury, the
imposition of the sentence is solely within the sound discretion of the
judge,81 and, in the exercise of this discretion, he may use material com-
pletely dehors the record.8 2 Courts, therefore, have great latitude to judi-
cially notice facts when sentencing a convicted defendant.
In ruling on motion for a directed verdict, however, the judge per-
forms a very limited function and exercises very little discretion. Since the
motion for a directed verdict is in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence,
the moving party concedes the truth of his adversary's evidence. 83  In
making a ruling, the judge is strictly limited to the adversary's evidence,
and, seemingly, must make no separate and independent findings. Con-
sidering the boundaries within which the judge must act in ruling on a
directed verdict motion, the scope of judicial notice should be concomitantly
narrow.
Thus, while the traditional approaches of classifying and defining the
scope of matters which are subject to judicial notice are helpful, the func-
tional approach is offered as a more appropriate analytical tool. The scope
of judicial notice of facts should vary according to the function the judge
is performing when notice is taken. It should be narrow at the pre-trial
level when he is deciding a motion for a summary judgment or a demurrer,
but broader when, at trial, he is determining preliminary fact questions or
ruling on the admissibility of evidence. His range of judicial notice should
be more limited when he is instructing the jury as the factfinders than when
he is making factual determinations in a nonjury trial. At the post-trial
stage of the proceedings, his discretion in using judicial notice should be
greater when ruling on motions for a new trial, or in sentencing a con-
victed defendant, than when he is considering a directed verdict motion.
Finally, the judge's freedom to employ judicial notice should be broadest
when he is performing a legislative function.
79. See Osborne v. United States, 351 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1965) ; Commonwealth
v. Brown, 192 Pa. Super. 498, 162 A.2d 13 (1960).
80. See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 301 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1962).
81. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 335 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Ex parte
Gutierrez, 82 Ariz. 21, 307 P.2d 914 (1957); Commonwealth ex rel. Lockhart v.
Myers, 193 Pa. Super. 531, 165 A.2d 400 (1960).
82. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
83. See, e.g., Palmer v. Brown, 127 Cal. App. 2d 44, 273 P.2d 306 (1954).
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III. EFFECT OF JUDICIAL NOTICE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Right to Trial by Jury
The traditional purpose of judicial notice has been to save the time of
courts and litigants by avoiding the process of proof of obvious matters.
Any reasoning process, including judicial reasoning, is incapacitated unless
some things are assumed which have not been formally proved.84 How-
ever, depending upon the phase of the proceedings in which it is being
used, and upon the procedure employed, judicial notice may have the
effect of removing issues of fact from the consideration of the jury which
would ordinarily be within that body's province. In a very real sense, the
function of the jury is usurped when some fact is judicially noticed which,
but for the judicial notice, would be a matter for its determination. There-
fore, the question arises as to whether judicial notice, in such instances,
violates the right to trial by jury. It should be noted that this constitu-
tional issue deals solely with the court's role in instructing the jury as to
adjudicative facts; that is, the only concern is with those matters which
are jury questions, a category which is limited to finding adjudicative facts.
Whether or not there is a violation of the right to trial by jury de-
pends upon the degree of usurpation of the jury's fact-finding function.
This, in turn, depends upon the procedure utilized by the court in noticing
the fact and in instructing the jury. Thus, it becomes necessary to deter-
mine the effect these procedures have upon the right in question.
1. Nature of the Right
The sixth and seventh amendments to the United States Constitution
guarantee the right to trial by jury in criminal and civil cases respectively. 5
The seventh amendment right to trial by jury is applicable only to the
rights and remedies which were generally known and enforced at common
law,8 6 and these include all the procedures that were recognized as jury
proceedings in the United States and England at the time the Constitution
was adopted.8 7 In cases in which a jury trial is guaranteed, the seventh
amendment requires that questions of fact be decided by the jury ;88 but it
84. See THAY"R, supra note 48, at 279.
85. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII. The sixth amendment guarantees the right to
trial by jury in all criminal prosecutions. The seventh amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
86. Kohn v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876); Agwilines, Inc. v. NLRB, 87
F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1936).
87. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Green, 37 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Ky. 1941).
88. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 24 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Wis. 1938), rev'd
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is particularly pertinent to a discussion of judicial notice that the require-
ment applies only to debatable issues of fact.89
The sixth amendment right to trial by jury in criminal cases has
been held to be so inviolable in our judicial system that it should be
jealously preserved 0  Nevertheless, a criminal defendant's right to trial
by jury only extends to issues of fact which bear upon the determination
of his guilt or innocenceY 1 This right implies that, on such issues, the
evidence against the accused shall come from the witness stand so that
he may have full judicial protection of his right to counsel, confrontation,
and cross-examination.
92
The federal guarantees of jury trial apply only to courts of the United
States and have not been made applicable to the states.9 3 This is of little
moment, however, since state constitutions confer a right to trial by jury
which, in civil cases, is generally patterned after the seventh amendment. 4
Similarly, the state provisions applicable to criminal cases protect essen-
tially the same rights as does the sixth amendment.95
2. Effect of Procedures on the Right
a. Disputables v. Indisputables. - Under one procedure, as discussed
earlier, a fact is not indisputable merely because it has been judicially no-
ticed. Any party may contest the judicially noticed matter by introducing
evidence to the contrary, and, while taking notice raises a presumption
in favor of the noticed fact, the jury is not bound to find the fact as
noticed. Under this approach, judicial notice cannot constitute a denial of
the right to trial by jury. If the matter is actually debatable,96 the parties
may introduce evidence, and the ultimate factual determination is left to
the jury.
A possible conflict with the right to trial by jury arises, however, in
jurisdictions which hold that judicially noticed facts are indisputable, for
in these jurisdictions the jury is given binding instructions to find the
facts as noticed. The right to jury trial guarantees that the jury will
determine issues of fact. If the fact which has been judicially noticed is
not literally indisputable a factual dispute does exist. Removing the dis-
pute from the jury's determination would be a denial of the right to trial
by jury to any party who wished to introduce evidence that common knowl-
edge is to the contrary or who could produce competent authority which
89. E.g., Hunt v. Bradshaw, 251 F.2d 103, 108 (4th Cir. 1958).
90. See, e.g., Rees v. United States, 95 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1938).
91. See, e.g., State v. Price, 59 Wash. 2d 788, 370 P.2d 979 (1962).
92. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
93. In Baker v. Utecht, 161 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 856,
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 831 (1947), it was stated that the sixth amendment was not
binding on the states; Olesen v. Trust Co., 245 F.2d 522 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 896 (1957), and Gustafson v. Peck, 216 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Iowa 1963),
reached the same conclusion with respect to the seventh amendment.
94. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. Declaration of Right § 3; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7;
PA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
95. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5; PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
96. See note 49 supra.
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held otherwise than the authority which was used by the court to verify
the noticed fact. Of course, if the noticed matter is unquestionably true,
there is no issue of fact, and, since the right to trial by jury extends only
to debatable issues of fact, there can be no denial of that right even in
a so-called "indisputables" jurisdiction.
At least one jurisdiction following the "indisputables" theory has at-
tempted to overcome the problem of infringement of the right to trial by
jury by holding that even though judicial notice has been taken, it is
not binding on the jury.97 Under this procedure the right to trial by jury is
preserved because the jury makes the ultimate factual determination. This
solution, however, is only a sham, for when judicial notice is taken, the
party opposing the noticed fact is afforded no opportunity to introduce
evidence to controvert the matter. Therefore, although the jury is not
given binding instructions, it has heard no evidence upon which to find
other than as the court has noticed. To make a contrary finding, the jury
must simply decide that the judge's common knowledge or verifying source
is contrary to fact. Not only would such a finding be highly unlikely, but
it could also give rise to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Further-
more, should the case be appealed, there would be no evidence on the
record to support the jury's finding.98
b. Notification. - Judicial notice must be taken of numerous facts
during the course of any trial. Hence, courts are frequently faced with
the question of whether or not to take judicial notice without first notifying
the parties of its intent to do so.99 Professor Davis, writing in a different
context,10 0 has suggested several variables upon which the court should
base its answer to this question. Among these are: (1) "the degree of
certainty or doubt - whether the facts are certainly indisputable, probably
indisputable, probably debatable or certainly debatable"; and (2) "whether
they are adjudicative or legislative facts."' 0'1 These variables can be used
profitably as a point of reference from which to examine the effect lack
of notification and opportunity to argue have on the right to trial by jury.
Obviously, it would be wastefully time-consuming, as well as un-
necessary to the protection of the right to jury trial, for a court to notify
the parties that it has judicially noticed, or is going to notice, a truly
97. See McCarthy v. Industrial Comm'n, 194 Wis. 198, 204, 215 N.W. 824,
826 (1927).
98. See Part V infra for a discussion of appellate review of judicially noticed
matters.
99. The notification issue, of course, has particular pertinence in a "disputables"
jurisdiction where, but for lack of notification, the parties might have been permitted
to present evidence to the jury. However, failure to notify may have constitutional
ramifications in an "indisputables" jurisdiction also if, through lack of notification, a
party is denied the opportunity to present "information" to the judge regarding the
propriety of noticing the fact in question. See note 102 infra.
100. See Davis, supra note 24, at 974-75, wherein the author criticizes the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, the Model Code of Evidence, and the Hoover Commission's Report
on Legal Services and Procedure provisions regarding notification.
101. Id. at 975.
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indisputable fact. 0 2 This is particularly true if the fact is not specifically
at issue.' 03 On the other hand, when a judge fails to notify the parties
that he has taken judicial notice of a debatable fact which is at issue,
10 4
and that he intends to instruct the jury as to that fact, there may be denial
of the right to trial by jury because the fact, having been predetermined
by the judge, is effectively removed from the province of the jury.
The Constitution requires that debatable issues of fact be decided by a
jury, and where the parties have no notification that the fact has been
determined by someone else, they have no opportunity to present their
respective sides to the jury for a decision. The jury, as a practical matter,
would be compelled to find as the judge instructed it, even absent binding
instructions.
As has been discussed, the scope of judicial notice of legislative
facts that the court notices in its law-making function is far broader
than the scope of judicial notice of adjudicative facts that the court notices
in its fact-finding function. Judicial notice of legislative facts was used
extensively, for example, by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Durham v. United States.105 There the court noticed the
writings of many medico-legal writers when it established a new test for
criminal responsibility. Judicial notice of legislative facts effectively deter-
mined the outcome, but the result was based on broad policy grounds,
rather than on facts peculiar to the case. Even though the decision was
made on policy grounds and was within the law-making function of the
appellate court, the jury had no opportunity to consider and determine
the truth of the legislative facts upon which the appellate decision was
based. It must be recalled that in its fact-finding capacity at trial the
jury's only function is to determine the relative merits of adjudicative facts
and that in noticing legislative facts in his law-making capacity, the judge
is performing a function which belongs to him alone. Nevertheless, it
seems that when ultimate disposition of a case is dependent upon legisla-
tive facts, the right to trial by jury may effectively be denied unless the
jury is permitted to determine the truth and authenticity of those legisla-
tive facts, particularly when the facts in question are subject to a great
deal of dispute.' 00 In such cases, it is arguable that until the jury deter-
102. While failure to notify under these circumstances does not violate the right
to trial by jury, it does raise a question of procedural due process and the right to
fair trial, a consideration which is beyond the scope of this Comment. It should be
here noted, however, that in the administrative law context it has been held that the
procedural due process requirements of fair play and fundamental fairness embodied in
the Constitution include the right of the parties to notification and an opportunity to
be heard. See, e.g., Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937);
United States v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co., 265 U.S. 274 (1924).
103. See, e.g., Stainback v. Mo Hok Ke Loc Po, 336 U.S. 368, 375 (1949) (air
carriage has brought Hawaii closer to the continent).
104. See, e.g., Currie v. Currie, 180 So. 2d 89, 92 (La. 1965) (all persons who
suffer from mental illness are not necessarily insane).
105. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See also Davis, supra note 24, at 953-54.
106. This situation also raises a procedural due process issue. See note 102 supra.
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mines the truth of the facts, the court should not utilize the facts to
make new law.
From the foregoing, it would appear that whether or not the parties
should be notified that the court has noticed, or is contemplating noticing,
a fact rests in the trial judge's sound discretion. In the exercise of his
discretion, he should consider all of the factors heretofore discussed, par-
ticularly whether the fact to be noticed is truly indisputable.
c. Common Knowledge v. Verifiable Certainty. - Generally courts
have refrained from finding that judicial notice violates the right to trial
by jury. In jurisdictions which abide by the common knowledge test, the
reasoning apparently is that the facts which are judicially noticed are so
well known that they need not be treated as triable issues.10 7 Since there
is no real issue of fact, there cannot be a denial of the right to trial by
jury.
0 8
The older test of judicially noticing only those facts within the com-
mon knowledge has been replaced, in many jurisdictions, by the test of
noticing facts which are verifiably certain. In Fringer v. Venema,10
for example, the court held that a judge, in his discretion, may take
judicial notice of facts of verifiable certainty by reference to competent,
authoritative sources. While Fringer is representative of the trend to
expand the scope of judicial notice, it also has provided safeguards which
should ensure the protection of the right to trial by jury. In that case,
the trial court was reversed because it failed to notify the parties that
judicial notice was being taken and failed to give them an opportunity
to present any sources which might have controverted the sources which
the court consulted. If the parties are notified and given an opportunity
to present their own contrary sources to the jury their right to trial
by jury cannot be said to have been violated, unless the judge has given
an erroneous binding instruction to the jury.
The verifiable certainty test, in addition to presenting all of the
hazards heretofore discussed regarding the right to trial by jury, raises
other problems as well. The court is permitted to verify any fact by
reference to competent, authoritative sources, 110 but nowhere can there
be found a definition of what constitutes competent or authoritative sources
for purposes of verifying judicially noticed facts. It would seem that
this determination is left wholly to the discretion of the trial judge. In
certain fields, this would not be a difficult task. For example, to judicially
notice the day of the week upon which a particular date fell, the court
need only look to a calendar for the year in question."' In other fields,
however, the task could be extremely difficult. A work by a Freudian
107. See, e.g., Richaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Waters-
Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U.S. 159 (1909).
108. See Olesen v. Trust Co., 245 F.2d 522 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
896 (1957).
109. 26 Wis. 2d 366, 132 N.W.2d 565 (1965).
110. See, e.g., id.
111. See, e.g., Sprowl v. Lawrence, 33 Ala. 674 (1859).
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psychiatrist, for example, might be considered competent and authoritative
by many, but a neuropsychiatrist probably would not agree. 112 In areas
like the latter, in order to preserve the right to trial by jury, the parties
should be put to their proofs, and the final determination should be left
with the jury.1 13 In effect, this solution is simply an exercise of wise
discretion by the court, similar to that which the judge must exercise when
deciding whether to notify the parties that he has noticed, or is contemplat-
ing noticing, a fact."
14
Since taking judicial notice is wholly within the discretion of the
court, a determination of whether it constitutes a violation of the right
to trial by jury must be made on an ad hoc basis. It is important, how-
ever, to realize that judicial notice of any fact may result in a denial of
the right to trial by jury. When a fact is debatable, notification should be
given to the parties so that they have an opportunity to offer rebuttal
evidence; facts disputable literally must not be made indisputable pro-
cedurally; caution must be exercised in distinguishing adjudicative facts,
utilized in the fact-finding function, from legislative facts, employed in the
law-making function, particularly in jurisdictions where the party against
whom the fact is noticed has the opportunity to attempt to rebut adjudica-
tive facts.
The direct question of whether judicial notice violates the right to
trial by jury has arisen infrequently, if at all. Perhaps this results from
the relative insignificance of the matters which have hitherto been judici-
ally noticed; or because the judges have exercised their discretion with
great restraint; or because many jurisdictions permit dispute of judicially
noticed facts; or because certain jurisdictions which hold that judicially
noticed facts are indisputable nevertheless permit the jury to find to the
contrary. In any event, if the present trend to expand the concept of
judicial notice continues, as seems likely, the courts must necessarily and
zealously guard the right to trial by jury from any infringements which
expansion of the concept may bring with it.
B. Right to Confrontation
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment," 5 applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment," 6 subject to certain excep-
tions,117 provides the criminally accused the absolute right to be con-
fronted in the courtroom by the witnesses against him. 118 The guarantee
has the secondary advantage of enabling the judge and jury to gain
112. See J. ROBITSCHPR, PURSUIT oi AcR"MINT: PSYCHIATRY AND TH8 LAW
22 (1966).
113. See Schilling v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 414 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1967).
114. See p. 545 supra.
115. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
116. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
117. See id.; Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542 (1926).
118. See, e.g., Curtis v. Rives, 123 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ; United States v.
Angell, 11 F. 34 (D.N.H. 1881).
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more insight into a witness' testimony since they are able to observe his
demeanor both on direct examination and under the pressure of cross-
examination." 9 The amendment extends to the testimony of witnesses
who testify under oath or whose testimony or statements are in some way
brought to the attention of the court and the jury at the trial.120 Since
all statements which are brought to the attention of the court must be
scrutinized in relation to the right to confrontation, it is relevant to
examine that right in relation to judicially noticed facts. The discussion
in this section will be confined to the right to confrontation in relation to
the finding of facts bearing upon the issue of innocence or guilt and to the
post-trial disposition process.
1. At Trial
When a jury trial is waived, it is the function of the judge to find
the facts bearing upon the accused's guilt or innocence; otherwise, this is
the jury's function, and the judge is concerned only with facts bearing upon
the sentence to be imposed. 121 The purpose of the right to confrontation
is to protect the accused's right of cross-examination,' 122 and confrontation
enables the factfinder to have a more reliable basis upon which to find the
relevant facts. Therefore, if a fact is judicially noticed - particularly
where judicially noticed facts are procedurally indisputable or where no
notification is given the accused that a fact has been judicially noticed -
the accused has no opportunity for cross-examination, and his right to
confrontation may effectively be denied.
There are, however, exceptions to the right to confrontation. "[i1t
has been customarily held that the right of confrontation may not be
invoked to exclude evidence otherwise admissible under well-established
legitimate exceptions to the hearsay rule.' 12 3 In this connection, it should
be noted that new exceptions to the hearsay rule may be carved out
"without violating constitutional rights, where there is reasonable necessity
for it and where it is supported by an adequate basis for assurance that
the evidence has those qualities of reliability and trustworthiness at-
tributed to other evidence admissible under long established exceptions
to the hearsay rule.'
2 4
Since many facts which are judicially noticed would also constitute
"well-established legitimate exceptions to the hearsay rule" if offered into
evidence, it follows that taking judicial notice of such facts would not
119. State v. Lonergan, 201 Or. 163, 269 P.2d 491 (1954).
120. State v. James, 76 N.M. 376, 415 P.2d 350 (1966).
121. See p. 545 supra.
122. State v. James, 76 N.M. 376, 415 P.2d 350 (1966).
123. McDaniel v. United States, 343 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1965) (no violation
of the right to confrontation where a document was admitted under the business
records exception to the hearsay rule). Cf. Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409,
418 (5th Cir. 1954).
124. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480-81 (4th Cir. 1958) (admission of
certificate of blood analysis did not deny the right to confrontation).
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violate the right to confrontation. 125 Similarly, it would appear that taking
judicial notice of matters which would constitute new exceptions to the
hearsay rule would not be violative of the confrontation clause as long
as there is an adequate basis for assuring their reliability and trustworthi-
ness. However, where attempts to create new exceptions to the hearsay
rule are contrary to the sound principles underlying the rule, that is,
"the very principles [of necessity and trustworthiness] which must have
been contemplated by the drafters of the Sixth Amendment," they are
violative of the right to confrontation.
126 Thus, in Pointer v. Texas,
1 27
the Supreme Court held that the accused was denied his right to con-
frontation when a transcript of the testimony of a witness at the accused's
preliminary hearing was introduced at the trial. The accused was not
represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing, and for this reason
the Court found that he was effectively denied his right to cross-
examination.
While the Court held that there had been a denial of the right to
confrontation in Pointer, it conceded that exceptions to the hearsay rule
such as dying declarations and prior testimony where the accused is
represented by counsel at the earlier proceeding are exceptions to the
right to confrontation. 1 2 Thus, Pointer should be classified as a case in
which the hearsay evidence involved did not constitute a well-established
and legitimate exception to the hearsay rule; in addition, the evidence in
question lacked the reliability and trustworthiness necessary to render it
an exception to the right to confrontation.
A recent case dealing directly with the issue of whether taking
judicial notice violates the right to confrontation is Wansley v. Wilker-
son.129 In a habeas corpus petition, the defendant alleged, inter alia,
that he had been denied a speedy trial. The trial judge, however, in
denying the petition, judicially noticed that the absence of a final con-
viction was the result of the defendant's own efforts and was not the
result of any nefarious plan employed by the Commonwealth. The notice
in this case was taken by a judge thoroughly familiar with the defend-
ant's position and the various proceedings which the defendant had insti-
tuted. Therefore, the defendant's right to confrontation was not denied
in this case any more than it would have been had the prior reported
testimony showing the same facts been introduced under the well-
established exception to the hearsay rule.
It seems, therefore, that, with respect to the right of confrontation,
judicial notice can be treated analogously to the hearsay exceptions.
As the concept of judicial notice expands, however, will it step beyond
the analogy to the hearsay exceptions? "While the Sixth Amendment
125. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) ; Mattox v. United States,
146 U.S. 140 (1892).
126. Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 418 (5th Cir. 1954).
127. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
128. Id. at 407.
129. 263 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Va. 1967).
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does not prevent creation of new exceptions to the hearsay rule based on
real necessity and adequate guarantees of trustworthiness, it does embody
those requirements as essential to all exceptions to the rule, present
or future."' 3 0 It would appear to follow that continued expansion of
judicial notice would not violate the right to confrontation so long as it
is kept within the same guidelines of necessity and trusworthiness.
2. Post-trial Disposition - Pre-sentence
Whether or not the criminal accused has a jury trial, it is the post-
trial function of the court alone to determine the sentence, within statutory
limits, based upon all the available facts.' 3' The issue to be discussed
here is whether judicial notice of material contained in the pre-sentence
report of a convicted defendant violates his right to confrontation.
The landmark case in the area, Williams v. New York,13 2 involved a
defendant who had been convicted of first degree murder in New York.
The jury had recommended that he be sentenced to life imprisonment.
The trial judge, however, on the basis of a Probation Department Report,
imposed the death sentence. The report included information that the
petitioner had confessed to other crimes, was a menace to society, and
had a morbid sexuality.13 3 The petitioner appealed on the ground that
the death sentence was imposed as a result of information supplied by
witnesses whom he was given no opportunity to confront or cross-
examine. In effect, the court judicially noticed extra-record matters in
determining the petitioner's sentence. The United States Supreme Court,
in affirming the petitioner's sentence, stated:
A sentencing judge . . . is not confined to the narrow issue of
guilt. His task . . . is to determine the type and extent of punish-
ment after the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly relevant -
if not essential - to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the
possession of the fullest information possible concerning the de-
fendant's life and characteristics. 34
Thus, the Court concluded not only that these extra-record facts could be
considered by a sentencing judge, but intimated that courts should resort
to them and rely upon them even though the defendant has not been
permitted to test their accuracy.
In Williams, the Court stated that it would be proper to sentence the
defendant to death on the basis of how his trial manner impressed the
judge and reasoned that it was equally proper to impose the death sentence
on the basis of a pre-sentence report. 135 A dissenting opinion disagreed
130. Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1954).
131. E.g., Wilson v. United States, 335 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; State v.
Adams, 1 Ariz. App. 348, 403 P.2d 7 (1965).
132. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
133. Id. at 244.
134. Id. at 247.
135. Id. at 252.
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on the propriety of imposing the sentence on the latter basis because all of
the evidence in the report was hearsay, and the evidence of other crimes
was irrelevant.186 The defendant's trial manner, upon which the Court
stated the death sentence could be properly imposed, is traditionally ac-
ceptable demeanor evidence, 18 7 but the evidence in the pre-sentence report,
as indicated by the dissent, is hearsay, and normally inadmissible. There-
fore, the Supreme Court seemingly has recognized an exception to the right
to confrontation when the sentencing judge judicially notices facts con-
tained in a pre-sentence report.
There are several obvious dangers in judicially noticing facts in a
pre-sentence report when the defendant has no opportunity to rebut the
content of the report. Persons supplying information upon which the report
is based may be biased against the defendant, or they may not know all
the facts, or they may supply only selected facts. Moreover, in many
instances, Williams being the ultimate example, the decision as to the
punishment to be imposed may be at least as important, if not more im-
portant, than the determination of guilt or innocence. Hence, in evaluating
the state of the law with respect to the constitutionality of judicially no-
ticing pre-sentence reports, the words of one eminent jurist should be
kept in mind:
[I]t seems . . . that a judge in considering his sentence, just as in
trying a defendant, should never take into account any evidence, report
or other fact which is not brought to the attention of defendant's
counsel with opportunity to rebut it.13
In conclusion, it seems that judicial notice in criminal cases is analo-
gous to the well-established hearsay exceptions at least to the extent that
neither has been treated as a denial of the right to confrontation. As in
the question of whether judicial notice violates the right to trial by jury,
there is little authority directly on point. Perhaps, again, the question
is seldom raised because the matters heretofore judicially noticed have
been relatively insignificant, or because so many jurisdictions allow dis-
pute of judicially noticed facts. Nevertheless, as the concept of judicial
notice expands, the problem may become more serious. In that event,
courts must exercise the utmost caution before exercising their discretion
in taking judicial notice.
The likelihood of violation of the right to confrontation seems greatest
in the presently excepted area of sentencing and pre-sentence reports.
However, in light of the specific right to confrontation protection accorded
by Pointer, and the general extension of constitutional guarantees of
criminal defendants, it is not inconceivable that the reversal of Williams
is forthcoming.
136. Id. at 253-54 (dissenting opinion).
137. See, e.g., 3 WIGMORt § 946; 2 WICMORX § 274.
138. Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REv.
1281, 1291 (1952) (emphasis added).
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IV. EFFECT OF JUDICIAL NOTICE ON THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
A. Nature of the System
The American adversary system is grounded upon the theory that the
fairest means of resolving controversies that may arise among the citizenry
is to permit the parties themselves to initiate and present their disputes to
an impartial tribunal by means of evidence that is subjected to the formal
rules of admissibility and the safeguard of cross-examination. 3 9 It is
thought that a partisan investigation and presentation by each adversary in
furtherance of his self-interest is more likely to elicit the truth than a duty-
motivated search and explanation by a court officer.140 Moreover, the
moral force of the court's decision will be enhanced if it is rendered by
someone completely detached from the initiation and presentation of the
case.' 4' As a result of the above considerations, in nineteenth century
America, the judge was relegated to the passive role of an umpire, and
any participation by him in the contest between the litigants was considered
unwarranted interference.
42
The adversary system, however, like other human creations, has its
inadequacies as well as its advantages. "It brings forth guile and conceal-
ment as well as truth. It presupposes equality of opportunity, means, and
skill; but these are seldom evenly matched. It often degenerates into trial
by combat with victory to the swift and strong rather than to the party
in the right.'
43
The acknowledgment of these inadequacies has led to a retreat from
the adversary system in its strict form. The trend today is toward more
judicial interaction and guidance.' 44 Judges are taking the initiative in
calling additional witnesses, ordering views, questioning witnesses, and
making non-binding comments on the evidence. 145 Furthermore, while
judicial notice has been a viable concept for many centuries, it is only in
the past century that the potentiality of the concept as a trial tool has been
recognized. If, however, the full potential of judicial notice is to be
realized, it must be expanded even further in years to come. It is sug-
gested that if the scope of judicial notice is broadened intelligently, the
concept can preserve the benefits of the adversary system and, at the same
time, mitigate against some of the inequities inherent in the system; that
is, judicial notice, properly utilized, can allow the judge to actively par-
ticipate in the litigation to further the discovery of the truth and the accom-
plishment of a just result - the ultimate objectives of the adversary system.
139. "The adversary system . . . presupposes . . . 'the principle of bilaterality' -
that opportunity be given to both sides to investigate and to present proof and legal
argument." F. JAMXS, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 (1965).
140. Id. at 4-5.
141. Id.
142. See Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice, in 29 ABA Rzp. 395, 405 (1906).
143. F. JAMES, JR., supra note 139, at 7; Pound, supra note 142, at 405.
144. See F. JAMES, JR., supra note 139, at 5-6.
145. Id. at 6.
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It is the purpose of this section to examine the procedures for taking
judicial notice heretofore discussed in an effort to discover and evaluate
their effects on the adversary system.
B. Effect of Procedures on the System
1. Tacit Judicial Notice
Although it be agreed that the judge's employment of judicial notice
is both proper and helpful, the question remains as to the propriety of
tacit notice; that is, should the judge take notice of a matter without in-
forming the parties that he is doing so. Keeping in mind that the primary
function of judicial notice is to promote convenience, 146 the answer to this
question depends, in part, upon the nature of the propositions being
noticed and the point in time when notice is taken. However, in answering
the question, consideration must be given to the need to retain those
characteristics of the adversary system which promote the discovery of
factual truths.
The judge should be permitted to tacitly notice matters which are
widely known and accepted by all1 47 - the meanings of common words,
that it is dark at night, or that children grow. These matters are so widely
accepted that neither party would want to dispute them, except for dilatory
purposes. Hence, the judge's failure to notify the parties that he is taking
judicial notice, and the consequent prevention of argument on the point,
has little effect on the adversary system since notice and argument would
be a needless gesture.
As previously noted, any process of reasoning necessitates the assump-
tion of certain propositions which have not been proven. 148 In making
such assumptions, the court is in reality taking judicial notice. For
example, if it be established that an accident occurred at night, the court
will not disregard this fact in determining the issue of how clearly the
defendant could see the plaintiff, notwithstanding the defendant's failure
to offer evidence that it is dark at night and that people cannot see as
well in the dark as they can in the light. The judge will take tacit judicial
notice of these commonly known facts.149 To ask him to notify the parties
of every such assumption would be unnecessarily time-consuming and a
practical impossibility. 150 Furthermore, to permit or require the parties
to offer formal proof in reference to such facts could serve no purpose
other than to preserve the adversary system in its rigid, common law
form, without enhancing the probabilities of discovering verifiable facts.
146. See Nicketta v. National Tea Co., 338 Ill. App. 159, 161-62, 87 N.E.2d 30,
31 (1949). See also Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and
Convenience, in PERSPECTIVES OF LAW 93 (1964).
147. Davis, supra note 24, at 975.
148. TIIAYER, supra note 48, at 279.
149. See Davis, supra note 24, at 975. Of course the jury also makes tacit assump-
tions in its reasoning process. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 20, at 299-300.
150. See Davis, supra note 24, at 975.
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On the other hand, tacit judicial notice should not be taken of specific
adjudicative facts. These are peculiarly within the knowledge of the parties
themselves, generally close to the center of the controversy, and the very
issues at which our adversary system should be aimed. Judicial notice of
these facts may lead to the unjustified acceptance of "untested" facts,
thereby undermining the moral force of the judgment.
Nor should legislative facts used in the law-making function be un-
qualifiedly subject to tacit judicial notice. It has been argued that the judge,
in developing law and policy, should be given more freedom to use
sources outside of the record without notifying the parties that he is doing
so'15 and that lack of notification is not unfair since the court may be in a
much better position than the parties to conduct a full and adequate
investigation of such legislative facts. 15 2 However, in the context of the
adversary system, other considerations strongly favor notification. First,
the material outside of the record that is judicially noticed by the court in
the process of laying down rules of law is necessarily not absolutely indis-
putable and at times is highly debatable. 15 3 Therefore, the parties should
be afforded the opportunity of presenting their views on the matter to
the judge in some manner - by brief, oral argument, or by supplying
him with sources supporting their contentions. Secondly, since appellate
courts most frequently engage in the law-making function, it is in these
forums that judicial notice of legislative facts will most often be taken.
If the court is one of last resort, and the judge first indicates that he has
taken judicial notice when he hands down his opinion, the parties are
effectively precluded from ever debating the matter noticed,5 4 which
matter, concededly, was debatable. Such a result is clearly inconsistent
with the basic principles underlying the adversary system.
Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich'5 5 is illustrative of such a result.
There the plaintiff claimed that its trademark for the magazine Seventeen,
was infringed by the defendant's use of the name "Miss Seventeen" for
its line of teenage underwear. Whether the two products were associated
in the minds of teenage buyers could hardly be termed absolutely indis-
putable. The appellate judge, however, in order to "feed" the court's
"judicial notice apparatus,"' 56 conducted a random survey in which he
questioned a number of teenagers and their mothers. As a result of this
survey, he concluded that "no one could reasonably believe that any relation
existed between plaintiff's magazine and defendants' girdles."' 157 Since it
was not learned that the judge had made such inquiries and had drawn
such a conclusion until the court's opinion was delivered, the plaintiff was
151. See, e.g., Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 548 (1929); Currie,
Appellate Courts' Use of Facts Outside of the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice
and Independent Investigation, 1960 Wis. L. Rpv. 39, 50.
152. Davis, supra note 24, at 964.
153. See p. 539 supra.
154. Morgan, supra note 49, at 293.
155. 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948).
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precluded from offering the results of any comparable poll he might have
conducted.
2. Disputables v. Indisputables
If a judge does notify the parties that he is taking judicial notice, or is
contemplating the same, three courses of action are then theoretically avail-
able. In some jurisdictions the parties are permitted to introduce evidence
to persuade the jury'58 that the noticed fact is not true. For example, in
State v. Kincaid,159 the defendant was convicted of violating a statute
which required the licensing of public dance halls located in communities
of less than 500 inhabitants. The trial court had taken judicial notice of
a national census listing Gold Hill, where defendant's establishment was
located, as having a population of 442. In discussing how the defendant
could have avoided the finding of the lower court, the appellate court stated
that "it would have been competent for him to place upon the witness stand
a qualified person who had ascertained the population of Gold Hill. Judi-
cial notice would not preclude the court from establishing the truth."'160
In State v. Duranleau,'6 ' the question was whether a certain street
was a public highway. The lower court took judicial notice of an ordinance
which so characterized the street, but the appellate court remanded to give
the opponent an opportunity to rebut the noticed fact. The court recog-
nized that some jurisdictions hold a fact judicially noticed to be con-
clusively established, but felt that "fairness in trial practice demands that




The taking of judicial notice in these "disputables" jurisdictions
operates as a presumption in favor of the noticed fact, and although the
presumption gives the proponent of the fact an initial advantage, the
opposing party is not precluded from presenting his views to the jury, and
the jury is not bound by this judicially noticed fact. Thus, in Timson v.
Manufacturers Coal & Coke Co.,'0 3 a tort action, the trial court took
judicial notice of the fact that all coal mines generate gas. The Missouri
Court of Appeals held that the defendant should have been permitted
to offer evidence to prove that his particular mine was not generating gas
at the time of the accident. The court stated:
The fact that courts in the first place, and as making out a prima facie
case, will take judicial notice of certain things does not preclude the
opposite party from rebutting such prima facie case. . . . Judicially
noticing facts, like many presumptions entertained by the courts, is
but a rule of evidence; and, if the question is a disputable one, or can
be disputed, evidence so disputing it is competent and should be
admitted. 164
158. Reference in this section is to the jury alone, although the material is equally
applicable to the judge as the factfinder in a nonjury trial.
159. 133 Or. 95, 285 P. 1105 (1930).
160. Id. at 104, 285 P. at 1108 (emphasis added).
161. 99 N.H. 30, 104 A.2d 519 (1954).
162. Id. at 32, 104 A.2d at 521.
163. 220 Mo. 580, 119 S.W. 565 (1909).
164. Id. at 598, 119 S.W. at 569.
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By allowing evidence to rebut the presumption, these jurisdictions have
kept the adversary nature of the proceeding substantially intact and have
ensured that judicially noticed facts can be tested by evidence opposing
the propriety of their acceptance.
The second possible course of action is evidenced by jurisdictions in
which once a fact is noticed and the parties so notified, no further argument
to the jury is permitted, for the jury is given binding instructions regard-
ing the judicially noticed fact. If the fact is truly indisputable, there could
be no reasonable argument by the opponent of the matter, and the failure
to allow such argument would not detract from the inherent reliability of
the noticed proposition. However, if the fact is indisputable only because
of the binding instructions, the refusal of the court to allow argument would
be contrary to the underlying rationale of the adversary system. Therefore,
in those jurisdictions which follow the view that judicial notice conclu-
sively establishes a fact, the courts must exercise great care that the
noticed facts are clearly beyond the realm of plausible debate. For ex-
ample, the court in Utah Const. Co. v. Berg'65 held that the Arizona
Industrial Commission should not have taken notice of the material in a
published symposium where the introduction to the discussion in question
admitted that the ideas expressed therein were not in agreement with
accepted views. The court insisted that only indisputable and certain facts
be noticed since notice dispenses with both proof of the fact and the oppor-
tunity to rebut it with evidence.166 Logically, there could be no substantial
rebuttal evidence to present to the jury when a fact is properly noticed
since the existence of such evidence would have prevented the matter from
being classified as indisputable in the first instance. As the court in
Nicketta v. National Tea Co.16 7 stated: "In a few cases it is said that the
judge should have received evidence offered to show the opposite of what
he declared to be a judicially noticed fact. What is meant is that the
subject did not fall within the realm of judicial notice."'6
If, when contemplating the notice of a fact that is not indisputable,
these jurisdictions were to allow neither rebuttal evidence before the jury,
nor argument before the judge in a nonjury proceeding, they would be
guilty of seriously undermining the basic precepts of the adversary system.
The judge would be making a finding of fact on an arguable issue without
allowing the parties to express their views or the bases therefor.
In many "indisputables" jurisdictions, although a party cannot pre-
sent evidence to the jury to rebut a noticed fact, he can, having been
notified that the judge intends to take notice, make an informal presenta-
tion before the judge in an attempt to convince him that the fact is not
a proper subject for judicial notice - that it is not indisputably true. The
165. 68 Ariz. 285, 205 P.2d 367 (1949).
166. Id. at 291, 205 P.2d at 370. The court noted that this rule was applicable to
judicial, as well as quasi-judicial, bodies. Id. See also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Ford,
68 Ariz. 190, 203 P.2d 633 (1949).
167. 338 Ill. App. 159, 87 N.E.2d 30 (1949).
168. Id. at 162, 87 N.E.2d at 31.
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proponent of the fact may likewise offer information tending to show
that the fact is indisputable. This third procedure for judicially noticing
facts is illustrated by the Nicketta case. There, the trial court took judicial
notice of the fact that a person cannot contract trichinosis from eating
properly cooked pork. The defendant had presented this "information" to
the trial judge, and, as the appellate court explained, the plaintiff had
presented no contrary information. He had filed no affidavits, nor had he
referred either the trial or appellate judge to any authority to attempt to
convince him that the matter was not indisputably true and, therefore, not
a proper subject of judicial notice, although it was clearly his option to
do so.169 This burden is more demanding than the regular in-court adver-
sary proceeding since its object is not merely to convince the factfinder
that the fact is true, but rather to convince the judge that the vast majority
of rational men believe the fact to be true and, therefore, indisputable.
170
Nevertheless, by affording the parties the opportunity to participate in the
proceeding, that for which the adversary system stands is not undermined.
Thus, regarding tacit judicial notice, it would appear that the funda-
mental principles of the adversary system are not violated if the noticed
facts are beyond the realm of reasonable challenge. Furthermore, the
benefits to be derived from the adversary system are not attenuated
if, with respect to debatable facts, the parties are notified and given the
opportunity to either introduce rebuttal evidence or present "information"
to the court. However, if the court takes tacit notice of a disputable fact,
or fails to offer an opportunity to formally or informally rebut such a
fact, the principles of bilaterality and party-presentation inherent in our
adversary system will be sacrificed. Hence, it would appear that expan-
sion of the scope of judicial notice will not necessarily undermine the
beneficial aspects of the adversary system provided that the courts, in
their search for factual truths, afford the parties the opportunity to
challenge "facts" that are not unequivocally true.
V. JUDICIAL NOTICE IN THE APPELLATE COURTS
A. Review of Judicially Noticed Facts
1. Grounds
Appellate review of matters judicially noticed at trial may take a
variety of courses depending upon the jurisdiction's theory as to the
scope of judicial notice and the procedures to be followed at trial. In a
"disputables" jurisdiction, for example, if the trier of fact, notwith-
standing the introduction of contrary evidence, finds the fact as noticed,
the opponent of the fact may argue that the fact was not within the proper
169. "It is the judge's function to decide whether a matter is a subject of evidence
or of judicial notice. The judge should be free to make for himself such investigation
as he desires, but he should also be able to call upon the parties for assistance." Id.
170. See Morgan, supra note 39, at 286.
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scope of judicial notice as defined by the jurisdiction.1 71 He will contend
that the fact was not unlikely to be challenged, that the judge should have
required proof of the matter, and that it was erroneous to have created
a presumption in its favor by taking judicial notice. If the judge judicially
notices a matter and permits evidence to the contrary and the jury finds
against the noticed fact, the opponent of the fact would not appeal since
the ultimate finding was in his favor, and the proponent of the fact
could not appeal since the judge ruled in his favor when noticing the fact.
If the jurisdiction adheres to the "indisputables" view, the opponent
of the fact may argue that the judge erred in noticing the fact because it
was beyond the scope of judicial notice as defined by that jurisdiction -
that is, that the fact is not literally indisputable.
Of course, a failure to adhere to the procedure adopted by the juris-
diction would be grounds for reversal on appeal. Thus, if rebuttal evi-
dence is admitted in an "indisputables" jurisdiction,'1 2 or is excluded
in a "disputables" jurisdiction,17 or if the court neglects to notify the
parties that it is taking judicial notice in a jurisdiction which requires
such notification,174 the trial court's finding may be set aside.
2. Scope
From the standpoint of traditional review of findings of fact and
decisions of law,'175 it would appear initially that since in taking judicial
notice the judge is deciding a factual issue, his decision should be sub-
ject to the standard of review for questions of fact. The judicial machine,
interested primarily in settling a particular dispute with finality, will
usually be equally satisfied with either a yes or no answer to a factual
proposition 76 and, consequently, an appellate tribunal will generally set
aside only a "clearly erroneous" finding. 177 Questions of law, however,
have but one right answer, uniformity being essential so that similar dis-
putes may be similarly decided. 178 Questions of law, therefore, are fully
reviewable, the appellate court not being bound at all by the conclusion
171. See In re Bowling Green Milling Co., 132 F.2d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 1942)
9 WIGMORE § 2567(c):
That the appellate tribunal is not concluded by the ruling of the trial Court,
would seem clear. The appellate tribunal may re-examine the question of judicial
notice, not only by reconsidering the information used by the trial Court, but also
by considering additional information.
172. See Verner v. Redman, 77 Ariz. 310, 314, 217 P.2d 468, 470 (1954); Utah
Constr. Co. v. Berg, 68 Ariz. 285, 291, 205 P.2d 367, 370 (1949) ; Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. Ford, 68 Ariz. 190, 196, 203 P.2d 633, 638 (1949).
173. Unless, of course, the fact is literally indisputable. See note 49 supra.
174. See, e.g., Fringer v. Vinema, 26 Wis. 2d 366, 132 N.W.2d 565 (1965).
175. See generally Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries:
A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REv. 70 (1944).
176. Roberts, Preliminary Notes Toward A Study of Judicial Notice, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 210, 211 (1966).
177. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a):
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury .... [flindings of fact shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.
178. Roberts, supra note 176, at 211.
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reached below.'7 9 Questions of fact which are the subject of judicial no-
tice, however, fall within a peculiar class, for although they are indeed
questions of fact, they, like questions of law, can have but one correct
answer. By definition they relate to matters of common knowledge or
verifiable certainty, and the same factual propositions may arise in dif-
ferent actions involving different parties. Thus, as in questions of law,
uniformity in these special fact questions is essential, and the judge's
decision to notice, or not notice, a particular fact as true should, like his
decisions on questions of law, be fully reviewable. 180
Policy considerations would also seem to mandate full review of the
trial judge's judicial notice ruling. This conclusion can be derived by
examining the usual arguments for limited review of facts and by noting
that such arguments have no applicability to facts that are judicially
noticed. For example, one of the reasons offered for limited review of fact
questions is that factfinding is within the prerogative of the jury, and,
therefore, the jury's finding should not be readily disturbed. 1 8 1 Since the
decision of whether or not to take judicial notice is within the judge's
sole discretion, full review of the judicially noticed fact will not detract
from the jury's fact-finding function.
Another reason asserted for limited review of facts is that the trier
of fact hears the witnesses and views the evidence and consequently can
better decide the issue than can the appellate court which has only a cold
record before it.182 In taking judicial notice, however, the trial judge
does not hear in-court witnesses nor does he receive formal evidence,
and any "information" that may be offered to help him make his ruling
may just as easily be presented to the appellate court. Similarly, since no
formal evidence of record is presented to the trial court on facts judicially
noticed, any argument that might be raised that findings of fact should
not be disturbed because of the impracticality of searching through a
long, involved trial record, 183 likewise has no bearing in the judicial notice
situation.
Finally, it can be argued that the scope of appellate review of
matters judicially noticed is, in reality, a moot issue since, regardless of the
trial court's action, the appellate court may make its own determination
of whether or not to notice a particular fact. Appellate courts can take
judicial notice of anything that the trial court could have noticed.1
8 4
179. See, e.g., Payne v. Winters, 366 Pa. 299, 77 A.2d 407 (1951).
180. See Roberts, supra note 176, at 215-18.
181. F. JAM8S, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11,13 (1965).
182. See, e.g., Pugh v. Cannon, 266 Ala. 97, 94 So. Zd 386 (1957) ; Hurst v. Bar
Rules Comm., 202 Ark. 1101, 155 S.W.2d 697 (1941).
183. See, e.g., Bradley v. Osborn, 86 Cal. App. 2d 18, 194 P.2d 53 (1948).
184. An appellate court can properly take judicial notice of any matter of which
the court of original jurisdiction may properly take notice. ...
In fact a particularly salutary use of the principle of judicial notice is to
sustain on appeal a judgment clearly in favor of the right party, but as to which
there is in the evidence an omission of some necessary fact which is yet indis-
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Therefore, an appellate court may view a matter as being within the scope
of judicial notice and can take notice of it even though the lower court
neglected or refused to do so.'8 ' On the other hand, if the lower court
did take notice which was erroneous in the eyes of the appellate court, the
appellate court can refuse to consider the fact as established for purposes
of appeal. 186
Thus, it appears that there should be full review of judicially noticed
facts whether the issue is viewed as a traditional law or fact question,
or as a policy question, or as a question of the appellate court's scope of
judicial notice in the first instance.
B. Original Judicial Notice
Because appellate courts are precluded from receiving evidence on
the issues before them, they have made wide use of judicial notice, especi-
ally in noticing legislative facts in their law-making function.18 7 For
example, appellate courts have judicially noticed that purchasers are
unlikely to be induced to mistake a nine and one-half or ten ounce loaf
of bread for a one pound loaf, 8 that the children of racially mixed
marriages are not inferior to their parents, 8 9 and that individual incentive
to invent is lacking in organized research. 190 They have also relied on out-
side sources to determine a proper depreciation method' 91 and a revolu-
tionary criminal insanity rule.192 In their fact-finding function, appellate
courts have noticed, for example, that trolley cars have gongs 19 and that
putable and a matter of common knowledge and was probably assumed without
strict proof for that very reason.
Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 343-44, 181 P. 223, 225 (1919). See pp. 559-61 infra.
See also note 171 supra.
185. See, e.g., DeMartini v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 215 Cal.
App. 2d 787, 30 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1963); UNIFORm RULP op EvIDeNCV 12(1); note
193 infra. Contra, Sites v. Morgan, 229 Or. 123, 366 P.2d 324 (1961) ; Walton v.
Stafford, 14 App. Div. 310, 43 N.Y.S. 1049, aff'd, 162 N.Y. 558, 57 N.E. 92 (1897).
186. See In re Bowling Green Milling Co., 132 F.2d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 1942).
187. McCormick, supra note 20, at 316.
188. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 517 (1924).
189. Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 720, 198 P.2d 17, 22 (1948).
190. Potts v. Cole, 140 F.2d 470, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1944). In Potts the court
refused to give patents to a corporation for group-developed products since the policy
behind patent grants is to foster individual initiative. This holding was based, in
part, on congressional hearings that the court had judicially noticed.
191. Massey Motor, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1960). Here, the Court
relied on text writers and accounting experts' reports to help determine the proper
method of depreciating the cars used in defendant's car rental business, which, when
sold and replaced with newer models, still had substantial salvage value.
192. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). In Durham the
court made innumerable references to psychiatric writings and reports, as well as to
the Royal Commissioner's Report, to come to the conclusion that the M'Naghten
right-wrong test of insanity was inadequate. For a more complete discussion of the
Durham case see p. 544 supra.
193. Mills v. Denver Tramway Corp., 155 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1946). In this case
the negligent plaintiff did not see the defendant's trolley approaching, and he was
struck. The trial court refused to instruct the jury that the last clear chance doctrine
would permit the plaintiff to recover if the jury found the defendant could have
warned the plaintiff in time to avoid the accident. The refusal was on the ground
that the plaintiff had failed to offer proof that the trolley had any warning device.
The appellate court reversed, taking judicial notice of the fact that the trolley had
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a bus terminal's restaurant is an integral part of the bus company's
business.194 Judicial notice has also been used in the review of a trial
judge's rulings on the admissibility of evidence 9" and demurrers.196
The procedure for taking judicial notice at the appellate level has been
criticized because of the failure of many appellate courts to notify the
parties of their intention to take notice or their refusal to afford the parties
an opportunity to present contrary "information" and argument.
197
Fairness to the parties would seem to require an appellate court to give
notification of its intent to take judicial notice, at least as to adjudicative
facts which the court feels might reasonably be contested. 198 Notification
may not be feasible as to legislative data, particularly when used by the
court in its law-making function, but the possible injustice that could be
engendered by lack of notification and opportunity to argue is made
obvious by the following observations of Professor Morgan:
When the resort to judicial notice is first made manifest in the
opinion of the court of last resort, it is usually too late to take cor-
rective measures. In reading data garnered from text books and ency-
clopedias, and statistics taken from specified sources, set out in an
opinion of a court of last resort, one often has a feeling
that they might have been contradicted or modified or explained by
diligent counsel aware that the court intended to use them.
199
Although the broad scope of judicial notice enjoyed by appellate
courts has been a source of criticism, 2 0 0 the fact remains that appellate
courts do need to be informed of legislative facts, disputed though they
may be, in order to pursue their role in developing law and policy. If
these courts were restricted to literal indisputables, the process of judicial
notice would be wholly inadequate °.2 0  This is particularly true where social
some warning device. It said that the trial court should have taken notice of that fact,
even though the plaintiff had not requested it to do so.
194. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960). In Boynton the Court took judicial
notice that a bus terminal restaurant was an integral part of the defendant's interstate
bus service, and therefore fell under the commerce clause prohibition against dis-
crimination by a carrier. The restaurant, which had maintained separate sections
for blacks and whites, was a private concern, neither owned nor operated by the
defendant bus company.
195. E.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
196. See, e.g.. DeBaker v. Southern Cal. Ry., 106 Cal. 257, 39 P. 610 (1895) ; Cole
v. Segraves, 88 Cal. 103, 25 P. 1109 (1891).
197. See Currie, Appellate Courts' Use of Facts Outside of the Record by Resort
to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, 1960 Wis. L. Riv. 39, 51-52; Morgan,
supra note 39, at 293.
198. Currie, supra note 197, at 51.
199. Morgan, supra note 39, at 293.
200. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 197, at 51-52.
201. Judicial notice, even if confined to indisputables, is usually adequate, however,
in cases testing the constitutionality of statutes. Since the burden is on the attacker
to show that there are no facts to justify the statute, his facts must, of necessity, be
indisputable. Note, Social and Economic Facts - Appraisal of Suggested Techniques
for Presenting Them to the Courts, 61 HARV. L. Rev. 692, 696 (1948). Some contend
that judicial notice of facts may be used only to uphold a statute, but not in striking
it down. See Currie, supra note 197, at 50-51. For a discussion of beyond-the-record
discovery of "constitutional facts" see sources listed in Davis, supra note 24, at 959
n.53; Note, supra at 693 n.7.
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and economic facts are concerned,20 2 since these are rarely undisputed.203
On the other hand, if appellate courts are permitted to notice a broader
scope of material, there exist problems of lack of regulation of the types
of sources they may consult 20 4 and of the thoroughness of their research, 203
as well as the lack of provisions for some type of recording of the
material relied upon.208
Thus, it has been shown that if a trial court notices matters beyond
the scope of judicial notice as defined by its jurisdiction, or if it fails to
abide by the procedures prescribed by its jurisdiction, an appellate court
has grounds to reverse the trial court's finding. Moreover, the appellate
court may fully review facts judicially noticed by the trial court.
Appellate courts may themselves notice facts in a fact-finding, as
well as a law-making, capacity, although it is in the latter capacity that
appellate courts are most active. While the possibility exists that an
appellate court may abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice either by
noticing facts clearly not within the scope of judicial notice or by neglect-
ing to notify the parties that notice will be taken of a fact which the
parties would have wished to debate, these contingencies can be avoided,
for the most part, by the court exercising its discretion wisely and by
according the parties the opportunity to challenge clearly conjectural legis-
lative "facts." It has been suggested that the necessity for judicial notice at
the appellate level be recognized 20 7 and that appellate judges be provided
with proper and effective machinery for so noticing.208 For example, it
could be provided that the court may appoint a special master or expert in
the area involved to fully investigate the matter in question, including a
perusal of the record of the proceedings below, and make a report to the
court.20 9 This report would serve the additional function of preserving a
record of exactly what the appellate judge considered in making his
ruling. The parties' rights as to notification could also be protected under
this procedure by having the master furnish copies of his tentative report
to each of the parties, and the master could hear any objections to its
contents before he files it with the court.210
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment, thus far, has examined the various theories and ap-
proaches to judicial notice and has scrutinized the effect the procedures
which have evolved from these theories and approaches have had on the
right to trial by jury, the right to confrontation, and the adversary system.
202. See Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLJm. L. Rtv. 1, 7 (1922).
203. See Note, supra note 201, at 694.
204. See Harris v. Pounds, 183 Miss. 688, 695, 187 So. 891, 893 (1939).
205. Note, supra note 201, at 698.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 701.
208. Id. at 700-01 ; Currie, supra note 197, at 49.
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In light of its expanding scope, however, a discussion of judicial notice
would not be complete without also inquiring into its potential effect on
two topics of contemporary concern - judicial administration and the
rules of evidence.
Throughout the country, trial backlogs are plaguing our courts. The
experience of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania illustrates the scope of this problem. As of June 30,
1966, this court had a backlog of 6,686 cases, approximately 1,100 of which
will go to trial. 21 ' A procedure facilitating an increased rate of disposition
of cases would not be a panacea for the backlog problem, but it would
certainly aid in decreasing the backlog, even in the busier jurisdictions.
Based on the affirmative duty placed on the courts to prevent delay,
21 2
it appears that the courts would be remiss were they not to take judicial
notice of facts which are literally indisputable. Indeed, notice of facts
which are not clearly indisputable, but which are not likely to be chal-
lenged, would also speed litigation. In "disputables" jurisdictions, notice
of such facts would not have a detrimental effect on constitutional rights218
or on the trial process 21 4 and, therefore, the acceleration resulting from
the elimination of time-consuming proof by at least one of the parties
might well justify such notice. However, in an "indisputables" jurisdic-
tion, taking notice of facts which are not literally indisputable can fall
subject to constitutional condemnation. Therefore, sound judicial ad-
ministration would seem to mandate universal adoption of the Wigmore-
Thayer theory as to the scope of judicial notice of facts noticed by the
court in its fact-finding function or in instructing the jury.
Judicial notice can also be an important tool for ensuring that evi-
dentiary technicalities do not subvert the primary purpose of the rules
of evidence - the exposure of the jury to relevant, probative, and com-
petent facts in an effort to facilitate the rendition of a just verdict. As
has been observed, laymen are of the belief that "justice follows too slow
and tortuous a path in reaching its goal and ... there is far too much
reliance on what he [the layman] considers 'technicalities'. '215 These tech-
nicalities in fact can, and often do, cause the exclusion of competent evi-
dence and increase the expense and delay attendant upon litigation.
Judicial notice can be utilized to obviate this problem in two ways.
The first method involves judicial notice of the evidence itself. To the
extent that judicial notice is taken of treatises, reports, and other reliable
materials relevant to the facts in issue, the necessity would be eliminated
for qualifying and examining expert witnesses and for the offering of proof
supporting the facts. Moreover, such a practice would prevent the best
211. Comment, 13 VILL. L. Rv. 137, 146 (1967).
212. See id. at 147.
213. See pp. 542-43; p. 547 supra.
214. See pp. 554-56 supra.
215. Kaufman, The Philosophy of Effective Judicial Supervision Over Litigation
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evidence and hearsay rules from causing the exclusion of competent evi-
dence.
Secondly, judicial notice can be utilized to establish a fact which
must be proven before certain evidence is admissible under one of the
rules of evidence. For example, the court could take judicial notice of the
qualifications of an author and admit his treatise into evidence under
the learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule. This procedure would
likewise eliminate the need to qualify the expert. Similarly, judicial
notice of an underlying fact can be used to qualify testimony which would
otherwise be subject to exclusion as lay opinion. A court, for example,
could take judicial notice of the fact that consumption of a certain amount
of alcohol will cause intoxication and, thereby, enable a witness to testify
that the defendant was intoxicated since the witness saw the defendant
consume the specified amount of alcohol.
Of course, the extent to which judicial notice is to be employed for
these purposes should depend on the degree of certainty of the fact to be
noticed and the jurisdiction's rules regarding rebuttal of judicially noticed
facts. Furthermore, it would appear that justice could best be expedited
by judicially noticing facts which are not likely to be challenged and by
allowing rebuttal when a reasonable challenge does ensue.
The courts, for the most part, have not abused their discretion in
taking judicial notice and, in fact should make more frequent use of this
device. "[It is] .. . too often the failure of our courts to use judicial
notice at all, rather than its misuse, that should cause public anxiety. ' 2 16
However, the courts must take care that substance is not sacrificed.
Moreover, it is vital that the rights to trial by jury and confrontation,




216. Keefe, supra note 9, at 665.
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